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FEDERAL GUN CONTROL IN THE UNITED
STATES: REVIVAL OF THE TENTH
AMENDMENT1
Despite an overall decline in crime rates in the United States,2
crime remains the foremost concern of most Americans. 3 One rea-
son for this is that easy access to handguns4 has led to growth in
the use of violence5 among an increasingly younger criminal sub-
' U.S. CoNsT. amend. X The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." Id.
2 See James Flanigan, Social Change Cheaper than $30-Billion Crime Bill, L.A. TnMEs,
Aug. 28, 1994, at D1 (reporting that statistics from Federal Bureau of Investigations show
decline in burglaries, homicides, rapes, and robberies after three decades of increases);
Handgun Waiting Period Goes Into Effect Today, THE REcoRD (Bergen, N.J.), Feb. 28, 1994,
at A6 [hereinafter Handgun Waiting Period] (citing decline in overall violent crime rate
from report by Bureau of Justice Statistics).
3 See Celinda Lake, Voters Want Action on Crime, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 1994, at 11A.
"As the recession receded, crime became voters' top concern and it remains there today
with 35% - 43% of voters saying it is the thing they worry about the most." Id.; see also
Littice Bacon-Blood, Crime Tops Worries in Parish Poll, THE TIMEs-PICAYUNE (New Orle-
ans), Sept. 10, 1994, at Al (reporting that despite 5% drop in reported crimes, crime re-
mained top concern of voters polled Aug. 31 and Sept. 1); Sharon Schmickle, Crime Experts
See Flaws in Bill's Focus; "Get Tough" Efforts Won't Stem Violence, They Say, STAR TRIuNE
(Minneapolis), Aug. 14, 1994, at 1A. "[Tihe number of crimes Americans deeply fear-the
murders and shootouts that make the evening news-has risen, the Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics said." Id.; Gordon Witkins, Should You Own a Gun?, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT,
Aug. 15, 1994, at 24 (arguing that increased randomness of crime, including carjackings,
drive-by shootings, and abductions, has caused people to be afraid); Charles V. Zehren,
House Struggles for Consensus, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Aug. 21, 1994, at A3. "Surveys show that
crime is one of the nation's highest concerns .... Id.
4 See 131 CONG. REc. S9101 (1985) (identifying growth of handguns over 35-year period
with 9.7 handguns per 100 people in 1945 and 23.9 handguns per 100 people in 1980);
Pistol Crimes Near 1 Million Mark, AP, May 16, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
AP File (citing FBI statistics that showing handguns were used in increasing number of
crimes, totaling 1 million in 1992); see also Witkins, supra note 3, at 24 (reporting existence
of 216 million privately-owned firearms, which more than doubles 1970 statistics).
5 See Flanigan, supra note 2, at D1 (observing that gang violence and drive-by shootings,
typically juvenile crimes, are on rise); Handgun Waiting Period, supra note 2, at A6 (noting
offense rate increased from 9.2% in 1979 to 12.7% in 1992); Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Omi-
nous Trends Undercut Dip in City's Crime Figures, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 15, 1994, at 1
(noting national statistics for murders committed by people under 25 have risen signifi-
cantly); Tom Morganthau, Gun Control: Too Many Guns? Or Too Few? Just as Congress
Starts to Get Serious, an Old Debate Revives, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 15, 1994, at 44. The author
quotes Rep. Charles Schumer of New York, who stated: "The reason that gun violence has
gone up is just how available guns are." Id.; Lea Sitton, Move Seeks to Regulate Gun as
Consumer Product, THE Tnss-PcAYuNE (New Orleans), May 8, 1994, at A7 (reporting that
handguns account for 25% to 30% of all firearms in American homes, but about 75% of all
firearm deaths and injuries).
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culture.6 Frustration with ineffective local efforts to combat crime
and stop the spread of illegal weapons,7 coupled with the constant
pressures on elected officials to be publicly perceived as being
"tough on crime,"8 have inspired numerous congressional initia-
tives to expand the federal role in attacking criminal activity, par-
ticularly in the area of gun control. 9 On March 1, 1994, for exam-
ple, Senator Howard Metzenbaum and Congressman Charles
Schumer proposed the Gun Violence Prevention Act, 10 otherwise
6 See Flanigan, supra note 2, at D1 (noting that nationally "foinly about 6% of young
people commit more than half the serious juvenile crime"); see also Anne Adams Lang, One
in Three City Youths Packs Heat, NEW YORK PosT, Sept. 23, 1994, at 11 (citing New York
City Council study which found that one in three young people in city were likely to be
carrying gun); Rod Nordland, Deadly Lessons: Kids and Guns, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 9, 1992, at
22 (discussing increasing gun-related violence and deaths in New York City Public
Schools).
7 See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 120, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 8860 (1994). Congress found that
"[s]tates, localities, and school systems find it impossible to handle gun-related crime by
themselves." Id.; Taming the Gun Monster: Doing It Right, L.A. TiEs, Nov. 8, 1993, at 6
(arguing state or community approaches to problem have not worked); see also Thomas
Ferraro, House Vote Shoots Down Assault Guns, Weapons Ban Passes by a Slim Margin,
N.Y. POST, May 6, 1994, at 7 (attributing passage of crime bill to "pleas from crime-weary
citizens"); see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
8 See United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087, 1093 (D. Colo. 1994) (discussing poli-
tics as driving force in passage of federal criminal laws); see Andrew J. McClurg, The Rheto-
ric of Gun Control, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 53, 73 (1992) (noting supporters of Brady Bill ap-
peared with police organizations to prevent criticism they are "soft on crime"); Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Federal Courts, 1993 Wis.
L.REv. 1, 7 (discussing "political appeal" of passing tough federal criminal laws); see also
David B. Kopel, On the Firing Line: Clinton's Crime Bill, HERrrAGE: FouND. REPORTS, Sept.
24, 1993, at 1 (arguing that although Clinton was elected because he appeared "tough on
crime," his proposed crime bill is unlikely to be effective).
9 See Deborah Pines, U.S. Judges Vote to Extend Cameras Experiment, N.Y. L.J., Mar.
17, 1994, at 1 (reporting on letter from N.J. Dist. Judge Maryanne Trump Barry expressing
concern about "the federalization of crimes traditionally prosecuted by state and local au-
thorities"); Federalization of State Crimes, MASS. LAwYERS WKLY., Nov. 4, 1991, at 4 (argu-
ing against trend toward federalization); Rehnquist, supra note 8, at 7 (observing that Con-
gress experiences frequent attempts to add to federal criminal code); see also Flanigan,
supra note 2, at D1 (noting 1994 Crime Bill, with $30 billion to build prisons, hire police,
and increase crime prevention programs, was passed, in part, in response to "[plublic anxi-
ety"); Julie Gould, Making the Federal Case of Customary State Crimes Seen by Some as a
Worrisome Trend, CmCAGO DAILY LAw BuLL., Sept. 21, 1993, at 1. Gould discussed the
problems associated with the federalization of crime, including prolonging civil trials. Id.
The author explained the opposition to such federalization by groups such as the Chicago
Bar Association's Federal Civil Procedure Committee and the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers Inc. Id.; Andrew Grene, States Still Key to Law and Order, Fed-
eral Officials Say, CHiCAGO DAmy LAw BULL., Jul. 9, 1993, at 3 (reporting comments of
Deputy U.S. Attorney General Philip Hegmann, who said Attorney General Janet Reno
"has a strong suspicion of the federalization of new crimes"); Tom Smith, Section Lets Pros-
ecutors, Defense Air Differences, THFE NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 55 (reporting that Ameri-
can Bar Association, along with coalition of 30 national organizations, recommended that
Clinton Administration "halt the growing trend toward federalization of state crimes").
10 S. 1882, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). The Gun Violence Prevention Act was originally
proposed by Senator Metzenbaum on March 1, 1994 and was cosponsored by Senators Ken-
nedy (Mass.), Bradley (N.J.), Lautenberg (N.J.), Boxer (Cal.), Pell (R.I.), and Chafee (R.I.).
Id.
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known as "Brady II," which would make it illegal to purchase a
gun without a nationally uniform, state-issued handgun license. 1
As debate continues on Brady II,12 questions about its constitu-
tionality, as well as the constitutionality of future gun control
laws, can be foreseen. Contrary to what one might expect, the
Second Amendment,'" which concerns the right to bear arms, is
unlikely to play a significant role in any challenge to these laws. 14
Judicial review of federal gun control laws typically has involved
the issue of whether Congress has properly exercised its authority
under the Commerce Clause. 15 Despite the Supreme Court's well-
established history of upholding federal legislation enacted under
the Commerce Clause,' 6 a considerable split has developed among
lower courts reviewing these laws. 17
Many have found that federal gun control efforts like the Gun-
Free School Zones Act,' 8 Firearms Owners' Protection Act, 19 and
11 Id. As it is currently written, the Handgun Control and Violence Prevention Act re-
quires the following, with respect to the creation of a national licensing system:
That all handgun buyers possess a handgun card, a nationally uniform license issued
through the states. This card will be issued after a thorough background check, includ-
ing fingerprints. The cards will be renewed every 2 years. Applicants must demon-
strate that the address used on the card is in fact their principal residence. They must
also complete a basic firearms safety course, and must pass a test on the subject. The
national handgun cards will be issued by the states following uniform minimum stan-
dards issued by the Secretary of the Treasury. These standards will ensure that the
cards are secure against forgery, and that each state's system for issuing the cards is
secure against fraud.
Id.
12 See 140 CONG REC. S2172, 2181 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1994) (statement of James Brady).
"And today, I begin the campaign for 'Brady II,' a comprehensive legislative plan to end
America's epidemic of gun violence." Id.; Handgun Control Inc. Applauds Assault Weapon
Ban; Gun Control Advocates Turn Attention to Brady 2, U.S. Newswire, May 5, 1994, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Libarary, Wires File (noting start of debate on Brady II).
is U.S. CoNsT. amend. II. The Second Amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear
Arms, shall not be infringed." Id.
14 See Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 247 (1989) (noting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174
(1939), was Supreme Court's only extended examination of Second Amendment). But see
Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 642 (1989)
(suggesting that despite inadequate attention given Second Amendment by constitutional
scholars, it still presents barrier to some gun control legislation).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1365 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114
S. Ct. 1536 (1994); United States v. Trigg, 842 F. Supp. 450, 453 (D. Kan. 1994) (holding
Congress did not properly articulate nexus to interstate commerce to utilize Commerce
Clause powers).
16 See discussion infra part I.
17 See infra parts II.A., II.B., II.C.
1s 18 U.S.C. § 922(qXl)(A) (1990). The statute states, in pertinent part: "It shall be un-
lawful for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe is a school zone." Id. The original section 922
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the Brady Act,20 to some degree, lack the constitutional underpin-
ning necessary for such an expansion of federal authority.2 '
Courts examining these laws focused on one of two concerns:
whether Congress had articulated a nexus between the gun con-
trol legislation and interstate commerce,22 and whether Congress
could impose an unfunded mandate on local officials to implement
a federal gun law.23 Central to these decisions is an express recog-
nition that Congress's Commerce Clause power is not unlimited
and an implied understanding that certain governmental func-
tions are still reserved for the states under the Tenth
Amendment. 24
This Note will address several constitutional obstacles which
the proposed national gun licensing system may encounter. Part
One will focus on the historical development of the Tenth Amend-
ment, with particular attention given to judicial interpretation of
was enacted as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-351 § 902, 82 Stat. 197, 26-35 (1968); see also discussion infra part II.A.
19 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1) (1986). The statute provides, in pertinent part: "It shall be un-
lawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine-gun." Id.; see also discussion infra
part II.B.
20 18 U.S.C. § 922(sX2) (1993). The Brady Act provides, in pertinent part:
A chief law enforcement officer.., shall make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5
business days whether receipt or possession [of a handgun by the prospective buyer]
would be in violation of the law, including research in whatever State and local record
keeping systems are available and in a national system designated by the Attorney
General.
Id. The penalty for one who knowingly violates subsection (s) of § 922 is a fine of up to
$1000, imprisonment of up to one year, or both. 18 U.S.C. § 924(aX5); see also discussion
infira part II.C.
21 See infra parts II.A, II.B, II.C.
22 See United States v. Bownds, No. 3:94-CR-50BN, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11738, at *13
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 18, 1994) (holding federal law banning possession of machine guns, 18
U.S.C. § 922(o) (1986), to be unconstitutional since Congress did not articulate nexus be-
tween gun ownership and interstate commerce); cf Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146,
152-53 (1971). The Court held that an antiloansharking statute was constitutional since
the proscribed activity fell within a "class of activity" which affected interstate commerce.
Id. As such, Congress could regulate this activity under the Commerce Clause. Id.
23 See Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1513 (D. Mont. 1994) (holding Con-
gress could not mandate state enforcement of federal gun control legislation); cf New York
v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2414 (1992) (holding while Congress has substantial
power to regulate interstate commerce, it could not force states to regulate in manner it
had chosen for disposal of low-level radioactive waste).
24 See Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1513 (holding federal gun control law requiring back-
ground checks to be unconstitutional because it violated state legislative process); see also
Kenneth May, Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Validity of Federal Legislation
under Tenth Amendment, Providing that Powers not Delegated to United States by Consti-
tution nor Prohibited by it to the States are Reserved to the States or the People, 72 L. ED. 2D
956, 959 (1982) (noting that Tenth Amendment requires federal government to share sub-
stantial sovereign authority with states).
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congressional powers emanating from the Commerce Clause.25
Part Two will analyze the constitutional problems encountered by
recent federal gun control legislation, including an examination of
cases ruling on the Gun-Free School Zones Act, Firearm Owner-
ship Protection Act, and the Brady Act. Part Three will consider
the specific constitutional problems a national gun license system
will face. Part Four will offer suggestions so that such a system
will be able to withstand constitutional challenges.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The federalist debate over the proper and intended roles of fed-
eral and state governments in American governance provides the
jurisprudential framework for courts deciding the numerous
cases2 6 which have arisen as a result of gun control laws.27 When
examining these laws, it does not matter if one frames the issue as
defining the reach of federal power expressly granted under the
Constitution or one of determining what rights have been re-
served for the states under the Tenth Amendment.28 In either
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause provides, in relevant part: "[t]he
Congress shall have Power... to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes. .. ." Id.
26 See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 293 (9th Cir. 1993), petition for cert.
filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 2424 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1994) (No.93-8487). The Edwards court diverged
from the opinion of the court in Lopez, ruling that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was
constitutional, since "it was reasonable for Congress to conclude that possession of firearms
represents a class of activities which affects interstate commerce." Id.; United States v.
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367 (5th Cir. 1993) (ruling Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitu-
tional because Congress lacked authority to enact it under commerce clause), cert. granted,
1145 S. Ct. 1536 (1994); United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
Firearms Owners' Protection Act to be constitutional exercise of congressional power under
commerce clause); United States v. Glover, 842 F. Supp. 1327, 1337 (D. Kan. 1994) (ruling
that rational nexus to interstate commerce could be found for prohibitions on possession of
firearms in school zones); United States v. Trigg, 842 F. Supp. 450, 453 (D. Kan. 1994)
(ruling Gun-Free School Zones Act unconstitutional because it was beyond Congress's
power under commerce clause); United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D. Colo.
1994) (upholding Gun-Free School Zone Act since "Congress reasonably could have found
that a nexus exists between the class of activity regulated... and interstate commerce").
27 See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417-19 (1992) (discussing framework
of government's division of authority and its constitutional implications); McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425-36 (1819) (deciding states do not have power to tax
federal bank); see also Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REv.
1, 14 (1950) (arguing that Tenth Amendment was not intended to affect division of power
between federal and state governments and when laws of each conflicted, Constitution
should be read as whole in interpretation).
28 See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2419 (1992) (holding unconstitutional
challenged provisions of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985,
Pub. L. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021B)).
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case, one must determine whether the law crosses the division be-
tween federal and state authority.29
The Tenth Amendment's 30 force derives from Article I of the
Constitution, which grants Congress numerous powers, including
the power to tax"' and to regulate interstate commerce.3 2 Con-
gress has used these powers to legislate on a constantly expanding
list of topics. 3 History shows, however, that the Framers of the
Constitution envisioned a far more restricted role for the federal
government.3 4 Within a federalist structure, state governments
were to have "dual sovereignty"3 5 with the federal government.
Accordingly, the power of each level of government would be bal-
anced against the other, although each would be supreme within
its sphere.36 The Tenth Amendment was passed to preserve the
29 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2419 (1992). The Court ascertained that
the affirmative provisions of the Constitution in conjunction with the core sovereignty
which States are to retain under the Tenth Amendment, should be a severe limitation on
the scope of federal authority. Id. Application of this theory to the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 led the Court to its determination that the federal
government had overstepped the boundary of its delegated power. Id.
30 U.S. CONST. amend. X; see United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (stating
that Tenth Amendment is "but a truism that all is retained which has not been
surrendered").
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress "Power to lay and collect Taxes").
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress power '[tlo regulate Commerce...
among the several States").
33 See Richard E. Levy, New York v. United States: An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of
Precedent, History, and Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal Power, 41 KAN. L. REv.
493, 496 (1993). "The federal government is omnipresent and all powerful, regulating virtu-
ally every aspect of our social and economic life." Id.; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964) (upholding congressional regulation of private
motel); Amesbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (6th Cir. 1979) (upholding
operation of municipal airport); Gold Cross v. Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 968 (W.D. Mo.
1982) (upholding federal regulation of ambulance services).
34 See New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2418 (1992) (noting that Congress
now legislates in areas never intended by Framers); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 452
(1991) ("The states retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme,
powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.") Id.; Corwin, supra note 27, at 22
(arguing that restrictive effect of American federalism on national government inspired
both "westward expansion of population" and later "laissez faire" attitude toward business
at turn of century); cf LEwis D. EIGEN & JONATHAN P. SmGAL, THE MACMILLAN DIarroNARY
OF Pou'ricAL QUOTATIONS 362 (1992). From a speech by former U.S. Congressman and Sen-
ator Stephen A. Douglas in Chicago, Illinois on July 9, 1858:
[There is] no right of Congress... to force a good thing upon a people who are unwill-
ing to receive it. The great principle is the right of every community to judge and de-
cide for itself whether a thing is right or wrong, whether it would be good or evil to
adopt it .... Whenever you put a limitation upon the right of any people to decide what
laws they want, you have destroyed the fundamental principle of self-government.
Id.
35 See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). The Court stated: "[U]nder our federal
system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government."
Id.
36 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. In Gregory, the Court noted in dictum:
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division of authority and to limit Congress to its enumerated pow-
ers. 7 To some degree, the Tenth Amendment implicitly played
this role during its first 150 years as the United States Supreme
Court struggled to define the reach of congressional powers under
the Commerce Clause.s
The Supreme Court underwent a dramatic shift in judicial phi-
losophy in 1937, becoming more permissive of federal regula-
tions.39 As a result, many of its earlier decisions were abandoned
or overturned. 40 This marked a historical low point for the restric-
tive effect of the Tenth Amendment, 41 as federal efforts to combat
Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate Branches of the Federal
Government serves to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one Branch,
a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will re-
duce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.
Id.; Levy, supra note 33, at 493 (discussing supremacy of federal enumerated powers).
37 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) (holding Congress had
right to establish national bank, while noting, in dicta, that government was one of enu-
merated powers); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803) (discussing
that federal government was to be limited to its enumerated powers); United States v.
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994). Federal
powers are intended to be "few and defined," while the powers "to remain in the [state]
governments are numerous and indefinite." Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)); see also GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTrruTIONAL
LAw 78 (12th ed. 1991). "IT]he Tenth Amendment was designed to allay fears ... frequently
expressed in the ratification debates.., of an excessively powerful, excessively centralized
national government." Id.
38 See Houston E. & W. Texas Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342, 354 (1914) (sus-
taining federal legislation regulating rail rates which discriminated against interstate rail-
road traffic); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1895). Striking down use
of the Sherman Act against sugar refineries, the Court stated that Congress did not have
authority under the Commerce Clause to reach a monopoly in manufacturing. Id.
In the New Deal Era of the 1930's, Congress responded to a severe economic crisis with
legislation on issues once considered strictly state responsibilities. See, e.g., Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303-04 (1936) (invalidating Bituminous Coal Conservation
Act of 1936, in part, on Commerce Clause grounds); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (striking down application of National Industrial Recovery
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 703 (1933), to interstate activity as beyond Congress's Commerce
Clause powers).
39 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (upholding Congress's power to
regulate goods through imposition of minimum wage); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (expanding Congress's power under Commerce Clause to intra-
state activities that have close and substantial relation to interstate commerce).
40 See Levy, supra note 33, at 495 (discussing Court's dramatic shift in 1937 leading to
expansion of federal power after Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 46, which upheld the
National Labor Relations Act). See generally Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and
the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARv. L. Riw. 645,676-85 (1946) (arguing that Presi-
dent Roosevelt's court-packing plan prompted Supreme Court to validate expansion of fed-
eral regulation).
41 See William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 1709,
1713 (1985). The Supreme Court has found legislation enacted by Congress under the Com-
merce Clause to be unconstitutional only three times since 1936. See New York v. United
States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2435 (1992) (holding Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amend-
ments Act of 1985 was unconstitutional); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985);
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national problems repeatedly superseded conflicting states' inter-
ests. 42 The Court further expanded congressional authority in Pe-
rez v. United States,43 when it ruled that an antiloansharking
statute was constitutional." The Court found that the prohibited
activity belonged to a "class of activity" which had a substantial
effect on interstate commerce, despite the fact that the activity in
question was itself local and did not involve any interstate
commerce.
4 5
In 1976, Chief Justice William Rehnquist heralded a change in
the Supreme Court's approach to such cases in National League of
Cities v. Usery.46 The majority opinion struck down the applica-
tion of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")4 7 to state employ-
ees, ruling that the intended use of the federal minimum wage law
was an impermissible attempt to encroach upon an area of "tradi-
tional state function."48 When the Court determined that the
FLSA violated the Tenth Amendment, it seemed to indicate a re-
turn to its earlier appreciation of state sovereignty.49
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), reh'g denied sub nom., Texas v. Mitchell, 401 U.S.
903 (1971); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (expanding Congress's
power under Commerce Clause to local activity "if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce"); Darby, 312 U.S. at 115 (1941) (holding that Commerce Clause pro-
vides Congress with plenary power so long as constitutional prohibitions are not infringed);
Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 43 (upholding National Labor Relations Act).
42 See Levy, supra note 33, at 496. The determinative factor in many decisions reviewing
congressional legislation from the post-New Deal era was whether the proscribed federal
action fell within the scope of federal powers, most typically the Commerce Clause. Id. at
495-96. The legislation's detrimental effect on state sovereignty was typically not consid-
ered; the Court's inquiry at that time was limited to "whether the federal action was within
the scope of federal power." Id. at 496; William A. Hazeltine, New York v. United States: A
New Restriction on Congressional Power Vis-a-Vis the States?, 55 OMO ST. L.J. 237, 237
(1994). The author stated: "From 1937 until present, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the Commerce Clause as a plenary grant of power to Congress, subject only to other consti-
tutional restraints." Id.
43 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
44 Id. at 156.
45 Id. at 153. The Court noted that defendant is a "member of the class which engages in
'extortionate credit transactions'" and that this group has the requisite definiteness to be
considered a class for regulatory purposes by Congress. Id.
46 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
47 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1938).
48 National League, 426 U.S. at 851-52. The FLSA violated the Tenth Amendment's
preservation of states' rights under a traditional state functions test. Id. at 845-52. Justice
Rehnquist wrote that the congressional exercise of power under the Commerce Clause in
this case was not permissible since it impaired the states' ability to "structure employer-
employee relationships" in traditional areas of state government like "fire prevention, po-
lice protection, sanitation, public health and parks and recreation." Id. at 851.
49 National League, 426 U.S. at 845 (holding Congress could not regulate "States as
States" in areas of traditional state function).
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As it turned out, the National League decision marked the start
of an uncertain path for the Supreme Court, while the Court
struggled to find a workable test for cases involving challenges to
state sovereignty.5 0 The "traditional state functions" test5 1 was
used to invalidate the FLSA because the Act regulated states as
states,52 addressed matters that indisputably concerned state sov-
ereignty,53 and impaired states' "freedom to structure integral op-
erations in areas of traditional government functions."54 This test
soon ran into difficulty,5 5 and it was eventually overturned in Gar-
cia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.56
For many, Garcia represented two important realizations by the
Court: that federalism issues were to be left for Congress to de-
5O Id.
51 Id. at 845-52.
52 Id. at 845.
53 Id- at 845-49.
'54 426 U.S. at 852.
55 See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764 (1982). The Court found it unneces-
sary to address the question of competing federal and state powers when upholding federal
legislation. Id.; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264,
287-88 (1981). The Court upheld the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,
30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1976 & Supp. III 1991), and distinguished this decision from the Court's
decision in National League as a law that regulates individuals and not a state. Id.
56 469 U.S. 528 (1985). In Garcia, the Supreme Court decided that the federal minimum
wage law could be applied to a municipal mass transit authority. Id. at 537-57. The Court
reasoned that it was within Congress's commerce powers, id. at 546-47, to legislate with
respect to states in the same manner in which it regulated private parties. Id. at 554. Jus-
tice Harry Blackmun noted that the states' role in the political process will prevent unduly
burdensome laws from being passed in the first place, id., and that the states' role in the
federal system would be protected by the political process. Id. at 551.
According to Garcia, the most significant limitation on congressional power under the
Commerce Clause is the requirement that the regulating activity have a substantial impact
on interstate commerce. Id. at 546-47. This has been interpreted to require two parts. Id.
First, there must be a significant number of "interstate transactions." Id. Second, "the reg-
ulated activity.., must have a direct causal nexus to interstate commerce. It is not suffi-
cient that the regulated activity affect another activity which, in turn, has a substantial
interstate commerce effect." Id.
Courts have recognized an expanding reach for the Commerce Clause. See Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824). In Gibbons, the Court recognized that Congress can
regulate activity "if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." Id. at
196; see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (stating that modem definition of
commerce power is at breadth of Gibbons); Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare
Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1983) (ruling that Tenth Amendment did not bar
FLSA's minimum wage provisions since federal power to regulate commerce did not under-
mine role of states); Molina-Estrad v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 680 F.2d 841, 845-46
(1st Cir. 1982) (concerning state operation of highway authority); Amersbach v. City of
Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (6th Cir. 1979) (upholding operation of municipal air-
port); Gold Cross v. Kansas City, 538 F. Supp. 956, 968 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (upholding federal
regulation of ambulance service). See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMiucA: TH PoLrncAL SEDUCTrON OF THE LAW 158 (1990). "[Tihe expansion of Congress's
commerce, taxing and spending powers has reached a point where it is not possible to state
that, as a matter of articulated doctrine, there are any limits left." Id.
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cide, and that the Commerce Clause was an essentially unlim-
ited source of congressional power.58 Despite the "virtual blank
check"59 to legislate that Congress had been given by judicial in-
terpretation of the Commerce Clause,6 0 states' rights were not en-
tirely forgotten by the Supreme Court. 1 Justice William Rehn-
quist predicted in his dissent to the five-to-four Garcia decision
that the federalist principles protected in National League6 2
would "in time again command the support of a majority of this
court."6 3
Rehnquist's prophecy was significantly fulfilled in New York v.
United States,64 when the Supreme Court recognized the need to
preserve a greater level of state sovereignty. 65 In New York, Con-
gress worked closely with states to create a scheme of deadlines
and penalties for states to facilitate the disposal of low-level radio-
active waste, either singularly or through regional compacts.66
Writing for the majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor sought to
reconcile the different approaches taken in National League and
Garcia.67 She avoided a direct confrontation with the Garcia pre-
cedent and the cases following it, by categorizing those cases as
57 See Hazeltine, supra note 42, at 243 (gleaning from Garcia that state sovereignty
would be better protected by political safeguards and not judicial system); Levy, supra note
33, at 498 ("[Tlhe Garcia Court concluded that the framers did not intend for the Supreme
Court to police the limits of federal power.... ."). See generally Edward L. Rubin & Mal-
colm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 908
(1994) (arguing that federalism remains in United States only because it is part of our
"collective psychology" and that it is no longer needed).
58 See Hazeltine, supra note 42, at 237. The author interpreted Garcia's holding to be
"that there was no judicial role in supervising the scope of the federal commerce power."
Id.; Levy, supra note 33, at 498 (arguing that Framers did not intend for Supreme Court to
monitor Congress's power, since political safeguards would prevent abuse).
59 United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (D. Colo. 1994) (noting that Con-
gress's nearly unrestricted power under the Commerce Clause is repugnant to "separation
of powers doctrine").
60 See United States v. Morrow, 834 F. Supp. 364, 365 (N.D. Ala. 1993). District Court
Judge William M. Acker, Jr. used hyperbole to note that the expansion of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause could lead to regulation of the "air in the soccer ball
used on the school playground, or a molecule or two of the milk dispensed in the school
cafeteria (especially if the milk is homogenized)." Id.
61 Id. (referring to Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985))
62 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (striking down application of federal minimum wage law,
Court noted it would have displaced states' authority guaranteed in Constitution).
63 Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
64 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
65 Id. at 2428 (recognizing that it is beyond authority of Congress to directly order states
to dispose of waste as Congress directs).
66 Id. at 2415.
67 Id. at 2420. Justice O'Connor characterized National League and Garcia as congres-
sional attempts to subject states to the same legislation that applied to private individuals
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instances in which legislation affecting states was applied to pri-
vate parties.68 Instead, New York involved a congressional at-
tempt to regulate the states themselves in a specific way, which
the Court decided was not within Congress's power.69 The con-
gressional scheme that developed 70 was ruled an improper usur-
pation of state power. 7 '
Two important themes emerged from the Court's decision in
New York: a renewed protection for state sovereignty, 2 and the
importance of political accountability for public policy decisions.7
As previously discussed,7 4 even with the expansion of federal pow-
ers in the postindustrialized era, the legislative intent behind the
Tenth Amendment justifies the imposition of restraints on federal
legislative authority.75 Thus, although Justice O'Connor referred
to the Tenth Amendment as a mere "tautology,"76 reminiscent of
the Court's Tenth Amendment views in Garcia, she nonetheless
preserved the Amendment's power to work with other constitu-
tional grants of authority to restrict congressional action if certain
or entities. Id. The statute in New York differs, since it is an attempt by Congress to direct
states "to regulate in... a particular way." Id. at 2408.
68 Id.
69 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2423 (1992) (noting that Commerce
Clause "does not authorize Congress to regulate state governments' regulation of interstate
commerce").
70 Id. at 2416-17. Congress's plan to eliminate waste under the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842, included three incen-
tives to encourage states to provide for waste disposal within their boarders: monetary
incentives, access incentives, and a take-title provision. Id.
71 Id. at 2434-35. "State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative
agencies of the Federal Government." Id. at 2434. In so ruling, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor pointed out that while there may be constitutional ways for the federal govern-
ment to legislate for the disposal of radioactive waste, the plan chosen is not one of them.
Id. at 2435.
72 Id. at 2418. In the Court's view, the Tenth Amendment requires inquiry as to
"whether an incident of state sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power."
Id. "If a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is
necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress." Id.
73 Id. at 2424 (noting that since state government officials "will bear the brunt of public
disapproval," accountability will be diminished if states act at will of federal officials).
74 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
75 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2421-23 (1992). In considerable detail,
Justice O'Connor considered the arguments presented at the Constitutional Convention
from which the government's structure developed. Id. She noted that the Convention par-
ticipants settled on the Virginia Plan, which permitted Congress to directly legislate the
people and did not require them to legislate through the states with the states approval.
Id.; see also supra notes 37, 42, 47-51, and accompanying text.
76 New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2418. The power of Congress is not restrained by the text of
the Tenth Amendment, per se, but rather "the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power
of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power
to the states." Id.
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states' rights were infringed. v Even the Garcia decision, which
upheld the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to munici-
pal workers 7 acknowledged that the federal legislation in that
case would not have been upheld if the Garcia Court had deter-
mined that it was destructive of state sovereignty.7 9
The New York Court also reinforced the idea that political ac-
countability is fundamental and necessary in a democratic sys-
tem.8 o Permitting federal policy to dictate state actions, which in
New York involved the politically charged issue of radioactive
waste disposal,8 would, in some cases, force state officials to be
accountable for the results of federally mandated policies over
which they had no control.8 2 If these policies later failed, the fed-
eral officials who had devised them would presumably face no
repercussions since such policies are typically implemented at the
state or local level.83 Justice O'Connor's concern over this issue
also found unlikely support from the Garcia case.8 4 While the
Court in Garcia believed the political consequences of the election
booth would prevent power-seeking federal politicians from de-
stroying state sovereignty, 5 it did concede the possible need for
judicial intervention to correct defects in the political system.86
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH GUN CONTROL LEGISLATION
By not expressly overruling Garcia, the Court in New York left
unsettled the extent of the Tenth Amendment's impact on future
cases. Courts reviewing federal gun control laws have interpreted
these and other Supreme Court cases differently and, as a result,
77 Id. at 2418.
78 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985).
79 Id. at 540.
80 New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2424 (1992); see also Hazeltine, supra
note 42, at 251 (arguing that without political accountability, citizens will not know who is
ultimately responsible for legislation of which they disapprove).
81 See New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2414-15.
82 See id. at 2427. The Court stated: "Accountability is thus diminished when, due to
federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the views of the
local electorate .... ." Id.
3 Id.
84 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551 (1985); see also
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) (citing Garcia's discussion of Tenth
Amendment limits on Congress's authority).
85 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 (arguing that through elections disenfranchised voters
could throw out politicians with whom they disagreed).
86 Id. at 554; see Baker, 485 U.S. at 512 (noting that Court in Garcia left open door for
possibility of invalidating legislation on Tenth Amendment claim).
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the Federal Courts of Appeals disagree as to the constitutionality
of these laws.8 7 Nonetheless, congressional authority to regulate
guns is well established,88 although the parameters of such legis-
lation are unclear.8 9 The following analysis of the judicial inter-
pretation of three federal gun control laws-Gun-Free School
Zones Act,9" Firearm Owners' Protection Act,91 and the Brady
Act 92-illustrates a renewed appreciation for federalist principles
87 See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1348 (5th Cir. 1993) (recognizing restrictions
on federal government announced in New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2408, court required congres-
sional findings which show nexus between prohibited activity and interstate commerce),
cert. granted, 1145 S. Ct. 1536 (1994); see discussion infra parts II.A., II.B., II.C. But see
United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1993) (relying on Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 156 (1971), court ruled that Congress did not have to make specific
finding of connection to interstate commerce), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 2424 (U.S.
Mar. 25, 1994) (No. 93-8487).
88 See Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 833 (1974) (noting that Congress has
power to regulate sale of handguns since they affect interstate commerce); United States v.
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1347-50 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994). In Lopez,
the bench reviewed four major crime bills regulating the ownership of certain types of fire-
arms: 1) National Firearms Act of 1934, I.R.C. § 5801-5872, 48 Stat. 1236-40 (imposing
$200 tax on transfer of certain weapons based on Congress's power to tax under U.S.
CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 1); 2) Federal Firearms Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1250 (repealed 1968)
(requiring firearm dealers to get federal license and prohibiting interstate shipment of fire-
arms to felons, persons under indictment for felonies, and persons lacking permits, if such
were required by state laws); 3) Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-351 (requiring federal license "for any person ... to engage in business of import-
ing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or ammunition" even though business did not
operate in interstate commerce); and 4) Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-681(I), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 106, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6510) (prohibiting transfer of firearms to "an alien or transient who
does not reside in the State in which the transferor resides"). 2 F.3d at 1348-60; Mack v.
United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1379 (D. Ariz. 1994) (discussing Congress's "raw power to
regulate the transfer of handguns"); cf Ann-Marie White, A New Trend in Gun Control:
Criminal Liability for the Negligent Storage of Firearms, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1389, 1393
(1993) (commenting that common law restrictions on right to bear arms have existed since
1328).
89 See, e.g., United States v. Bownds, No. 3:94-CR-50BN, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11738,
at *12 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 18, 1994). Chief Judge William H. Barbour, Jr. explained: "This
Court is concerned over the increasing federalization of crime by Congress, when such fed-
eralization occurs in apparent disregard of the Tenth Amendment mandate that rights not
delegated to the federal government be reserved to the states." Id. Compare 140 CoNG. REC.
H67, 2 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1994) (statement of Rep. Owens: "[Tihe Federal Government has
the right to regulate the ownership of guns by individuals in any way they see fit. They can
regulate guns, they can require licensing, they can place taxes on them.") with 140 CONG.
REC. S6078, 63 (daily ed. May 16, 1994) (statement of Sen. Hatch) "Now they want an
assault weapons ban.., to take away the rights of American citizens, as defined in the
Second Amendment to keep and bear arms, which is certainly more than a militia right as
defined by some today." Id.
90 The Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. II 1990).
91 The Firearm Owners Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1988).
92 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (Supp. V 1993).
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in some courts93 and continued affinity for congressional expan-
sionism in others.9
4
A. Gun-Free School Zones Act
Designed to address the rising problem of violence in schools
and the increased gun use linked to the national drug problem,95
the Gun-Free School Zones Act 98 was passed in 1990. This Act
made it a federal crime to possess a firearm within 1000 feet of a
school. 97 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
provided the forum for the first challenge to this law's constitu-
tionality after Alfonso Lopez Jr. was arrested at Edison High
School in San Antonio, Texas for carrying an unloaded .38 caliber
handgun and five bullets.9"
The court in United States v. Lopez99 echoed the sentiments of
Justice O'Connor in New York v. United States100 when it con-
cluded that a state's sovereignty traditionally dictates regulation
of the possession of guns and such state authority could not be
infringed upon by the congressional mandate of section 922(q) of
93 See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that state
sovereignty was infringed upon by Gun-Free School Zone Act), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct.
1536 (1994); United States v. Bownds, No. 3:94-CR-50BN, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11738, at
*13 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 18, 1994) (ruling that Firearm Owners' Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(o) (1986), which made it federal crime to possess machine gun, was unconstitutional
because Congress failed to articulate connection between gun ownership and interstate
commerce); Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1375 (D. Ariz. 1994) (ruling Brady
Act unconstitutional since Congress had exceeded authority under Art. I., § 8 of the U.S.
Constitution); United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 242 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (deter-
mining that federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1992), was unconstitutional be-
cause it exceeded Congress's commerce power); cf DON B. KATEs, JR., FuIRARMs AND Vio-
LENCE, IssuEs OF PUBLIC POLIcY 16 (1984) (arguing that because crime control is state
issue, federal action needs some affirmative constitutional authority).
94 See United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 292 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that Gun-Free
School Zones Act was constitutional exercise of congressional power).
95 See H.R. Rep. No. 1015, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 249 (1990) (subcommittee discussing
gun violence in schools); 135 CONG. REc. E3988, 164 (1989) (statement of Rep. Feighan).
When the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 was introduced, Representative Feighan
noted specific acts of violence in schools in Illinois, California, and New York. Id. He also
stated that "because guns and drugs often are found in close proximity, eliminating guns
will contribute to the war against drugs." Id.
96 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. II 1990).
97 18 U.S.C. § 922(qXIXA) (Supp. II 1990) (making it federal crime to "knowingly possess
a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a
school zone").
98 See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct.
1536 (1994); Marcia Coyle, Justices Tackle Term Limits, Guns and Beer, NATL L.J., Oct. 3,
1994, at Al (describing facts of case, Ms. Coyle reported that Alfonso Lopez was arrested
for violating federal law when he arrived at Edison High School in San Antonio, Texas).
99 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994).
100 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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the Gun-Free School Zones Act.101 The court reasoned that Con-
gress had failed to properly invoke its powers under the Com-
merce Clause when it enacted this legislation. 10 2 Absent a clear
nexus between the possession of a gun within 1000 feet of a school
and interstate commerce, the court ruled that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act was unconstitutional. 03 The court in Lopez dis-
tinguished the rationale of earlier rulings from the courts of the
Eighth10 4 and Ninth'0 5 Circuits, which upheld a different provi-
sion of section 922, stating that those courts seemed to rely on
weak congressional findings and legislative history of bills that
never became law.10 6
In stern language, the Lopez court demanded that in the future,
Congress clearly articulate the constitutional basis for its actions
when it endeavors to expand its powers.' 0 7 Apparently acknowl-
101 Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1364. "[Tlhe general control of simple firearms possession by ordi-
nary citizens, [has] traditionally been a state responsibility, and section 922(q) indisputa-
bly represents a singular incursion by the Federal Government into territory long occupied
by the States." Id.
102 Id. at 1365.
103 Id. (discussing that in order to expand congressional authority in manner this act
intends, there must be clear expression of Congress's intent); see also United States v. Mor-
row, 834 F. Supp. 364, 365 (N.D. Ala. 1993) (noting that "Commerce Clause [power] is not
infinite," so Congress must articulate nexus to interstate commerce in order to expand its
authority). But see United States v. Holland, 841 F. Supp. 143, 144 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (finding
Gun-Free School Zone Act to be proper exercise of Congress's authority under Commerce
Clause, since "Congress need not make specific findings" of connection to interstate
commerce).
104 United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1614
(1993). "We conclude, as did the Ninth Circuit on similar grounds, that 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)
(1988) is within the authority granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause." Id.
105 United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991). The court stated:
Congress need not make specific findings of fact to support its conclusion that a class of
activity affects interstate commerce. It was ... reasonable for Congress to conclude
that the possession of firearms affects the national economy, if only through the insur-
ance industry .... ITrhis rather tenuous nexus between the activity regulated and
interstate commerce is sufficient.
Id.
106 See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1356. Evans and Hale sustained the Firearm Owners Protection
Act § 922(o), "in reliance on Congressional findings that appear to us to be inapplicable in
the present context . ." Id. For example, Hale notes the legislative history of H.R. 3155
and H.R. REP. No. 495, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1327, 1327-31, which were to outline the possession of machine guns. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1350.
However, the court felt "it would be entirely inappropriate to consider [this bill and report]
as having any relevance beyond machine guns .. . ." Id, at 1356-57.
107 See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1359-64. 'Courts cannot properly perform their duty to deter-
mine if there is any rational basis for a Congressional finding if neither the legislative
history nor the statute itself reveals any such relevant finding." Id. The court pointed to
H.R. Rep. No. 101-681 (I), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1990), the report accompanying the
Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 104 Stat. 4789-4968,
which made no mention of the impact of the Gun Free School Zone Act on interstate com-
merce. Id. at 1359. In addition, the court noted that when President George Bush signed
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edging its omission, Congress later amended the Gun-Free School
Zones Act with an express statement articulating the bill's nexus
to interstate commerce010 It remains to be seen if the Supreme
Court will give any weight to this postenactment action.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Lopez court's
approach in United States v. Edwards0 9 when it found the Gun-
Free School Zones Act to be "a permissible exercise of congres-
sional authority under the Commerce Clause."110 Fundamental to
the Edwards court's divergence from the earlier ruling was a nar-
row interpretation of two earlier decisions-Perez v. United
States,"' which upheld a federal antiloansharking statute, and
United States v. Evans,"2 a Ninth Circuit gun control case that
followed the Perez rationale. 1 3
The court in Edwards cited the Perez decision for the proposi-
tion that specific congressional findings of a connection between
the regulated activity and interstate commerce are not required
for the court to determine that a "reasonable" Congress would find
such a nexus.1 4 Yet, despite the Court's holding in Perez, legisla-
tive history of the antiloansharking law involved in that case
the bill, he remarked that it lacked the necessary connection to interstate commerce to be
constitutional. Id. at 1360.
10s See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. II 1990). The amendment stated in relevant part:
(1)(A) Crime, particularly crime involving drugs and guns, is a pervasive nationwide
problem; (B) Crime at the local level is exacerbated by the interstate movement of
drugs, guns, and criminal gangs; (C) firearms and ammunition move easily in inter-
state commerce and have been found in increasing numbers in and around schools... ;(D) in fact, even before the sale of a firearm, the gun, its component parts, ammunition,
and the raw materials from which they are made have considerably moved in inter-
state commerce... ; (G) [a] decline in the quality of education has an adverse impact
on interstate commerce ....
Id.; see also 1994-95 Term Opens; Breyer Seated; Other Developments, FACTs ON FILE
WoRLD NEWS DIGEST, Oct. 6, 1994, at 727 C3 [hereinafter 1994-95 Term Opens]. "Congress
had amended the language of a crime bill that was passed in August to link the movement
of guns in interstate commerce with the impact the resulting violence had on the quality of
education." Id.
109 13 F.3d 291 (9th Cir. 1993).
110 Id. at 292. The court recognized the conflict between a previous Ninth Circuit deci-
sion, United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1991), and the Fifth Circuit decision in
Lopez, but decided to follow their decision in Evans. 13 F.3d at 294; see supra notes 113-23
and accompanying text.
111 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
112 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991).
113 Id. at 862 (agreeing with Perez, 402 U.S. at 152-56, that court must determine if
reasonable Congress would find that class of activity regulated affects interstate
commerce).
114 Edwards, 13 F.3d at 295 ("Congress need not make particularized findings in order to
regulate"); see also United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (citing United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119). The Court noted that under the Commerce
Clause, Congress has the power to regulate "those activities intrastate which so affect in-
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reveals a well-discussed connection by Congress between the regu-
lated activity and interstate commerce."15 Thus, the Edwards
court's reliance on Perez suggests an implicit recognition of the
importance of articulating a connection to interstate commerce. It
must be noted, however, that Perez upheld the federal statute in
that case because it determined that loansharking belonged to a
"class of activity" that, due to market or competitive forces as de-
termined by Congress, would affect interstate commerce. 116 Simi-
lar congressional findings do not exist for the Gun-Free School
Zones Act. 1 7 Absent such findings, as the Lopez court noted, it is
injudicious for the bench to determine that the mere possession of
a weapon will affect market forces in the way loansharking did.1 8
The court in Edwards also relied heavily upon United States v.
Evans," 9 which upheld a federal statute prohibiting the posses-
sion of machine guns.'2 ° The Edwards bench stated that it was
compelled to do so absent an intervening Supreme Court decision
preventing Congress from so expanding federal powers.' 2' The
New York case, however, seemed to provide the Fifth Circuit with
the judicial intervention it required-a strong statement of the
terstate commerce... as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment
of a legitimate end. . . ." 402 U.S. at 151.
115 Perez, 402 U.S. at 155-56. The Supreme Court decided that an activity regulated by
states, such as loansharking, is a national concern and within Congress's power to regu-
late. Id. Legislative history included the McDade Amendment, see 114 CONG. REc. 14,391
(1967), which was based upon a report that found that loansharking was "one way by which
the underworld obtains control of legitimate businesses." Perez, 402 U.S. at 155. Congress
also knew about a report entitled New York's Report, An Investigation of the Loan Shark
Racket, see 114 CONG. REc. 1428-31 (1965), which found that although the loansharking
transactions may have been purely local in nature, "they nevertheless directly affect inter-
state and foreign commerce." Perez, 402 U.S. at 155-56.
116 Perez, 402 U.S. at 155-56.
117 See 135 CONG. REC. E3988, 164 (1989) (announcing intention of bill "to address the
devastating tide of firearm violence in our nation's schools," without noting connection to
interstate commerce). Id.
118 Cf 1994-95 Term Opens, supra note 108, at 727 C3 (noting that National Conference
of State Legislators and National Governors Association were opposed to bill); Coyle, supra
note 98, at Al. According to Anthony T. Case of Sacramento, California's Pacific Legal
Foundation, an amicus party supporting Mr. Lopez: 'This is an issue of local crime. We
think there are some limits to congressional power and hope the court will recognize that."
Id.
119 928 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1991).
120 Id. at 862.
121 See Edwards, 13 F.3d at 294 (citing United States v. Frank, 956 F.2d 872, 882 (9th
Cir. 1991)) ("In the absence of an intervening Supreme Court decision or an Act of Congress
that nullifies Ninth Circuit precedent, we must adhere to the law of the circuit .... ").
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Supreme Court's recognition of the need for restraints on federal
authority vis-a-vis the states.'22
Notwithstanding the effect of New York, the Edwards court's
purported reliance on the stare decisis effect of Evans123 is still
misplaced. It is well established in judicial history that a court
may depart from a prior court's ruling if it finds significant rea-
sons for doing so.124 Evans based its decision to uphold the Fire-
arms Owners Protection Act, 125 in part, on the connection it found
between regulating guns and the effect violence has on the na-
tional economy. 126 This connection was based, however, on the
general finding that firearms have been used to kill people. 127 The
court in Edwards seems unjustified in relying on that decision
since this overly-broad legislative intention does not indicate how
this specific activity sought to be regulated affects interstate
commerce. 1
28
Judicial confusion on this issue and improper reliance on prece-
dent has led to a related dichotomy of opinion among federal dis-
trict courts in the Tenth Circuit as well. 129 A week after one dis-
122 See generally New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2423 (1992) (discussing
restraints on congressional power under Commerce Clause).
123 928 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1991). Creed Evans was arrested for selling machine gun parts
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1986). Id. at 859.
124 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808-09
(1992). Justice O'Connor commented that stare decisis does not require blind adherence to
past cases. Id. The Court's pragmatic test for examining prior holdings included: whether
the court's ruling is still workable; whether the prior court's ruling had been relied upon;
whether new rules of law had developed since the past case; whether facts have changed,
making the rule insignificant. Id.; Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991). "Stare
decisis is not an inexorable command... [wihen governing decisions are unworkable or are
badly reasoned," courts are not required to follow precedent. Id.; Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, 665 (1944) (noting that throughout its history Supreme Court has been free to
abandon precedent with which it disagrees); see also Earl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts on the
Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law, 1980 Wisc. L.REv. 467, 492 (arguing that
"absolutely rigid adherence to stare decisis might be inappropriate even where the law is
fairly consistent").
125 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1988).
126 See Evans, 928 F.2d at 862 (noting congressional finding that 750,000 had been killed
in United States by firearms since turn of century, "[ilt was thus reasonable for Congress to
conclude that the possession of firearms affects the national economy").
127 Id.
128 Id. (noting since no specific Constitutional rights are implicated, "tenuous nexus" be-
tween national homicides and Act are sufficient); see also New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2423. In
New York, the Court recognized limitations on Commerce Clause powers when it held that
Congress could legislate in this area, but not in the manner it had chosen. Id.
129 Compare United States v. Trigg, 842 F. Supp. 450, 453 (D. Kan. 1994) (ruling
§ 922(q) unconstitutional) with United States v. Glover, 842 F. Supp. 1327, 1336 (D. Kan.
1994) (holding that § 922 is constitutional) and United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp.
1087, 1092 (D. Colo. 1994) (ruling § 922(q) constitutional).
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trict court in Kansas struck down section 922(o),110 another
district court in the same state ruled that it was a proper exercise
of congressional power.13 ' In the latter decision, the bench fol-
lowed the reasoning of the courts in Perez and Edwards,32
although it acknowledged that the decision in Lopez was persua-
sive.' 3 3 The Supreme Court is expected soon to rule on the Lo-
pez' 3 4 case, which should provide needed guidance to courts con-
sidering this statute.
B. Firearm Owners' Protection Act
The Firearm Owners' Protection Act ("FOPA")135 makes it un-
lawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun.'3 6 This
Act has been subject to similarly inconsistent judicial interpreta-
tion; consider the recent cases of Wendell Ardoin137 and Charles
M. Bownds.18 Mr. Ardoin, an avid gun dealer and collector, made
his living in Louisiana through the purchase and sale of automatic
130 See Trigg, 842 F. Supp. at 453 (D. Kan. 1994). The court ruled § 922(q) unconstitu-
tional since Congress had failed to articulate a nexus betwaen the prohibition and inter-
state commerce. Id. Adhering to the values of federalism, the court followed the Lopez ra-
tionale from the 5th Circuit and rejected the approach of the court in Edwards. Id. at 452-
53. The court also noted the need to eradicate weapons around schools, but only in a man-
ner consistent with congressional power. Id. at 453.
131 See Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. at 1092 (upholding constitutionality of § 922(q) based upon
Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 152-56, court noted that "Congress need not make new particularized
findings of an interstate commerce nexus in order to legislate"); see also Glover, 842 F.
Supp. at 1336 (upholding constitutionality of § 922(q) since "a rational basis supports a
finding that guns affect interstate commerce").
132 See Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. at 1089.
133 Id. at 1094 n.11. The court expressed its frustration that "Congress is stretching the
commerce power far beyond its intended scope... [to] conduct that does not affect inter-
state commerce to the states and the people. Id. The Ornelas court similarly relied on
Supreme Court's decision in Perez to conclude that a finding of a connection with interstate
commerce was not necessary. Id. at 1089. Instead "a court must determine whether Con-
gress reasonably could have found a nexus between the class of regulated activity and in-
terstate commerce." Id. (citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 152 (1971)); see also Glover, 842 F. Supp.
at 1336. Judge Kelly decided that no congressional hearing was needed to pronounce a
nexus between the legislation and interstate commerce because of the seriousness of the
problem of guns near schools. Id.
134 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994).
135 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1988) (enacted as new section to Firearm Owners' Protection Act
§ 102(a), 100 Stat. 452-53 (1988)).
136 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1988); see also United States v. Rock Island Armory, Inc., 773 F.
Supp. 117, 119 (C.D. Ill. 1991) (interpreting § 922(o) as prohibition on private citizens from
possession or transferring machine gun that was not made and registered before May 19,
1986, unless such transfer or possession is authorized by federal or state governments).
137 United States v. Ardoin, 19 F.3d 177, 178 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 327
(1994).
138 United States v. Bownds, No. 3:94-CR-50BN, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11738, at *2
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 18, 1994).
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and semiautomatic weapons to local police departments. 3 s On
November 6, 1991, he was indicted on fourteen counts of violating
FOPA, including charges of possession of machine guns.140 At
about the same time in nearby Jackson, Mississippi, Charles
Bownds was arrested for a similar violation of FOPA.141 It was
alleged that Mr. Bownds purchased two Sten machine guns at a
gun show in New Jersey for $300 and later sold them to Randy
and Danny Hammond for $1500.142
As with the Gun-Free School Zones Act cases, courts reviewing
these unrelated events and other alleged violations of FOPA have
focused mainly on the Perez-type question: whether a congressio-
nally articulated nexus to interstate commerce is required for leg-
islation enacted under the Commerce Clause.
The general confusion surrounding the interpretation of the gun
control statutes is illustrated by the Fifth Circuit's treatment of
FOPA in the Ardoin143 and Bownds144 cases. Coming only several
weeks after the Lopez decision and its favorable treatment of fed-
eralist principles, 45 the court in United States v. Ardoin 4 6 found
section 922(o) of FOPA to be constitutional, based in part, upon
Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. 47 But the
court's assertion that "no one could seriously contend that the reg-
ulation of machine guns could not also be upheld under Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce," 4 seems to ignore the
Supreme Court's current federalist sympathies expressed in New
York v. United States. '49 The reasons for the Fifth Circuit's appar-
ent shift towards the more liberal jurisprudence of the Ninth Cir-
cuit are unclear, but the court in Ardoin did limit the effects of
139 Ardoin, 19 F.3d at 178-79.
140 Id. at 179.
141 Bownds, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *1-2.
142 Id. at *2.
143 19 F.3d at 180 (upholding National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), (e), (1) and
§ 7201 (1988), "on the preserved, but unused, power to tax or on the power to regulate
interstate commerce").
144 No. 3:94-CR-50BN, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11738 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 18, 1994).
145 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. But see FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S.
742, 757 (1982) (upholding Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act even though some of its
provisions were not directly related to purpose of fostering interstate commerce).
146 19 F.3d 177 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 327 (1994).
147 Id. at 180. Contra United States v. Bownds, No. 3:94-CR-50BN, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11738, at *13 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 18, 1994) (holding § 922(o) unconstitutional since it
would not be "difficult for Congress to find an interstate nexus as a part of its legislative
history process").
148 Ardoin, 19 F.3d at 180.
149 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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this change by noting in dictum that Congress's power to regulate
under the Commerce Clause is not without restrictions. 15 0
Interpretation of section 922(o) is likely to be revisited because
of the vastly different approaches taken by the district court's ad-
judication of Mr. Bownds's case. By adhering to the Lopez ration-
ale, Chief Judge William H. Barbour, Jr. created a split in the rea-
soning among the lower courts with his decision in United States
v. Bownds.15 1 Judge Barbour disregarded the Ardoin opinion, in-
stead requiring Congress to articulate a nexus between interstate
commerce and the regulated activity, and absent such, found the
Act beyond Congress's power. 152 The court was notably concerned
about threats to state sovereignty caused by the federalization of
crime regulations in disregard of the Tenth Amendment. 1 53
C. The Brady Act
The Brady Act 5 1 was enacted in 1993 behind tremendous popu-
lar support.1 55 Inspired by the assassination attempt on President
Ronald Reagan 156 and the "cold, stark figures" of gun-related vio-
150 Ardoin, 19 F.3d at 180 n.5 (noting Lopez, court acknowledges some limitations exist
on Commerce Clause, but does not explain what limitations are).
151 Bownds, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11738, at *13 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 18, 1994). Contra
United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1018 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding § 922(o) to be constitu-
tional and within Congress's Commerce Clause power since Congress did indicate nexus
between regulation of guns and interstate commerce), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1614 (1993);
United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding § 922(o) constitutional
within Congress's Commerce Clause power, since "Congress need not make specific find-
ings of fact to support its conclusion that a class of activity affects interstate commerce").
152 United States v. Bownds, No. 3:94-CR-50BN, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11738, at *13
(S.D. Miss. Aug. 18, 1994). Chief Judge William H. Barbour, Jr. was unsatisfied with the
bill's sparse legislative history, noting that the bill's sponsor, Representative Hughes, pro-
vided the only explanation for it. Id. at *4. Hughes had commented that "I do not know why
anyone would object to the banning of machine guns." Id. at *4. Judge Barbour concluded it
would not have been difficult for Congress to have found the requisite connection to inter-
state commerce." Id. at *13.
153 Id. at *12. "[T]he fact that an item is dangerous does not signify, without more, that
regulation of that item meets constitutional requirements for avoidance of the mandate of
the Tenth Amendment." Id. at *7; see also Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985) (hold-
ing that state is separate sovereign entity from federal government); Abbate v. United
States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959) (holding primary responsibility for defining crimes lies
with state).
154 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (Supp. V 1993).
155 See H.R. REP. No. 102, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1991) (noting Sept. 1990 Gallup poll
which found "95 percent of those surveyed support a seven-day waiting period").
156 Id. After the attempt on President Reagan's life on March 30, 1981, "America's collec-
tive memory will be forever seared with the images of James Brady and two law enforce-
ment officers lying wounded and bleeding on the sidewalk. . . ." Id.
1994]
172 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:151
lence, 15 7 the Brady Act nevertheless took seven years to get
through Congress, hindered by extraordinarily partisan rheto-
ric.'15 In part, the law requires the "chief law enforcement officer"
("CLEO") to make a reasonable effort to perform a background
check of prospective gun buyers within five days of the request.15 9
While public debate focused largely on the waiting period require-
ment and possible violations of the Second Amendment, it is the
background check provision 6 ° and its Tenth Amendment implica-
tions that have been the focus of constitutional scrutiny.'' The
"congressional findings" requirement, which had been the center
of debate on the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the Firearm Own-
ers Protection Act,' 6 2 has not been at issue in cases ruling on the
Brady Act's constitutionality. Brady decisions have placed more
emphasis on the New York v. United States168 -type question:
157 Id. (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, Department of Justice, July 8, 1990) (report-
ing that between 1979 and 1987 "criminals armed with handguns assaulted 693,000 peo-
ple"). Id.
158 See McClurg, supra note 8, at 55 (illustrating how both sides in Brady Bill debate
resorted to rhetorical fallacies to advance agendas); William A. Rossbach, Brady Gun Bill
Passes in House, LA. Tnum, May 15, 1991, at B6 (pointing out that, while Brady Bill is
accomplishment, it is only small one, and will hardly bring end to gun-related violence in
America); see also Philip Weiss, A Hoplophobe Among the Gunnies, N.Y. Tmos, Sept. 11,
1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 66 (stating that partisan rhetoric played prominent part in Crime
Bill debate).
159 18 U.S.C. § 922(sX2) (Supp. V 1993); see supra note 20 (citing relevant provision of
Brady Act).
160 18 U.S.C. § 922(sX2). The statute provides in relevant part:
A chief law enforcement officer to whom a transferror has provided notice pursuant to
paragraphs (1)(AXiXIII) shall make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business
days whether receipt or possession would be in violation of the law, including research
in whatever state and local record keeping systems are available and in a national
system designated by the Attorney General.
Id.
161 See, e.g., Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1381-82 (D. Ariz. 1994). The
court struck down § 922(sX2) as violative of the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. Id. In addi-
tion to the plaintiff's arguments in McGee, the plaintiff in Mack unsuccessfully argued a
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment on the grounds that Brady's enforcement consti-
tutes "involuntary servitude." Id. at 1382; McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 324
(S.D. Miss. 1994). The plaintiff in McGeeargued that the Brady Bill violated both Article I,
§ 8 and the Tenth Amendment "in that it 'commandeers' a state sheriff to administer a
federal act regulating gun purchases." Id. Moreover, he argues that the penalty section of
the Brady Bill is too vague and therefore, violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Id.; cf Kimberly Stalings, Book Review, 31 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 529, 530-31(1993) (reviewing EIK LARSON, LETHAL PASSAGE: How THE TRAvELS OF A SINGLE HANDGUN
EXPOSE THE ROOTS OF AMERCA'S GUN Cmsis (1994)). Stallings agreed with the book's au-
thor that an "instant" background check may be difficult to implement, considering that
"only seventeen percent of United States criminal records were ready to go into the system
as of February 1994." Id.
162 See discussion supra parts IIA., II.B.
163 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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whether Congress has the authority to require local law enforce-
ment officials to perform background checks.1 6 4
Printz v. United States'65 was the first of four decisions in which
a portion of the Brady Act was ruled unconstitutional.166 As with
the other cases, a local sheriff brought an action to seek injunctive
relief against enforcement of the Brady Act's provision requiring
him to perform a background check on individuals seeking to
purchase a firearm.' 67 The plaintiff, Sheriff Jay Printz, argued
that he did not have sufficient resources to perform the back-
ground checks.16 8 Under the statute, Sheriff Printz faced personal
liability for failure to comply.' 6 9
The Printz court found that the Brady Act transgressed the
proper "division of authority between the federal and state govern-
ments." 70 The bench pointed out that Congress had rejected ef-
forts to make the sheriff-performed background check optional.
17 1
Although the court did not go so far as to say so, this suggests that
the court viewed this legislation to be in violation of the Com-
merce Clause. ' 72 The court stated that although Congress can en-
list the judicial branch to enforce its policies, it may not directly
164 See McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 324; Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1382 (D.
Ariz. 1994).
165 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994).
166 See McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 324 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (striking down
§ 922(sX2) of Brady Law as violative of Tenth Amendment); Frank v. United States, 860 F.
Supp. 1030, 1044 (D. Vt. 1994) (holding that § 922(sX2) violates Tenth Amendment); Mack,
856 F. Supp. 1372, 1381-82 (striking down § 922(s) of Brady Act as violative of both Fifth
and Tenth Amendments); Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1511-12 (holding that since background
check was intended to be mandatory, it was unconstitutional).
167 See McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 324; Frank, 860 F. Supp. at 1030; Mack, 856 F. Supp. at
1374; Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1506.
168 See Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1507 (noting testimony of plaintiff "that enforcement of
the [Brady] Act forces him to reallocate already limited resources such that he is unable to
carry out certain duties prescribed by state law").
169 See 18 U.S.C. § 924(aX5) (Supp. V 1993). The statute provides: "Whoever knowingly
violates subsection (s) or (t) of section 922 shall be fined not more than $1,000.00, impris-
oned for not more than 1 year, or both."
170 Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1513 (D. Mont. 1994); see United States v.
Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 244 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (noting that historically, law enforcement
has been responsibility of state and local governments, particularly since "we as a nation
deplored the idea of a national police force"), reu'd sub nom. United States v. Osteen, 30
F.3d 135 (6th Cir. 1994), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Oct. 24, 1994) (No. 94-6640); Gould,
supra note 9, at 1 (discussing federalization of state crimes, including carjacking).
171 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1512 (noting that Rep. Steve Schiff's amendment to make
performance of background optional was rejected).
172 Id,; see also McGee v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 321, 326 (discussing that despite
defendant's contentions, Congress intended bill to be mandatory, since it had earlier re-
fused to change statute's wording to allow for nonmandatory checks).
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compel states to legislate to "enforce a federal regulatory
program." 1
7 3
Federal district courts in Arizona, 1 74 Mississippi, 175 and Ver-
mont 1 76 similarly have ruled that the Brady Act exceeded congres-
sional authority. These cases have found that Congress has the
authority to legislate on the general subject of guns, but not in the
manner which it has chosen. 1
77
The political accountability concerns raised in New York v.
United States are revisited in these cases.' 78 The Brady Act re-
quires sheriffs to direct potentially scarce resources toward per-
formance of background checks and away from areas that might
be considered a greater priority in their jurisdictions. 179 The court
in Printz noted that this mandate would force the local sheriff to
provide fewer services, for which locally-elected officials would be
held unjustly accountable.'1 0 An Arizona district court, in Mack v.
United States,'"' expanded on this point, by noting that such a
seizure will undermine the purpose of federalism, namely "to en-
sure that interests of the citizens are adequately represented. " 18 2
173 Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1513 (citing New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2420
(1992)).
174 See Mack, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1379-81 (D. Ariz. 1994). The Mack court used a two-
prong test to examine the Brady Law. Id. First, the court noted that Congress indisputably
has the authority to regulate the sale of handguns because they affect interstate commerce.
Id. at 1379. On the second prong, however, the court questioned the "rational connection"
between the background check and the type of regulation desired. Id On the latter point,
the court found that Congress did not have the authority to regulate in the manner it had
chosen. Id. at 1379-80. Therefore, the Brady Law's provision mandating state law enforce-
ment performance exceeded congressional power and violated the Tenth Amendment. Id
at 1381. The court also found that the provision violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Pro-
cess Clause. Id. at 1381-82. Contra Koog v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (W.D.
Tex. 1994) (ruling that government mandated duties are only temporary and minimal).
175 See McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 326-27. Relying heavily upon New York v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992), the court held that Congress could not mandate Sheriff McGee to
perform a background check. McGee, 863 F. Supp. at 326-27.
176 See Frank v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1042-43 n.13 (D. Vt. 1994). In ruling
the Brady Law unconstitutional, the court noted that Sheriff Frank's exclusive reliance on
the New York decision was justified: "ilf a party is going to rely exclusively on one case, the
most recent Supreme Court case discussing the issue at hand is not a bad choice." Id.
177 See Mack, 856 F. Supp. at 1379-80 (noting that Congress has "raw power to regulate
the transfer of handguns," but did not exercise this power properly in Brady Act).
178 Printz, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1514-15 (D. Mont. 1994).
179 Id. at 1515 (noting that local governments will be left with choice to divert resources
for background checks or raise taxes).
180 Id
181 856 F. Supp. 1372 (D. Ariz. 1994).
182 Id. at 1380.
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III. PROSPECTS FOR A NATIONAL GUN LICENSING SYSTEM:
AVOIDING THE PROBLEMS OF NEW YORK AND PEREZ
Since local efforts to regulate guns have been ineffective in re-
ducing gun trafficking between states and in stemming the tide of
gun-related violence,1 83 calls for national action do not seem un-
reasonable. But if the history of gun control legislation serves as
any guide to its future, a number of necessary obstacles stand in
the way of a national licensing system. 8 4
In a general sense, as many of the abovementioned cases reflect,
there is a growing concern among judges about the increase in fed-
eral criminal legislation, 8 5 particularly since many of these acts
may be illegal under state law or are traditionally regulated by
states.' 86 These laws place considerable power in federal prosecu-
tors, including discretion to decide which criminals will be prose-
cuted in state courts and which will face the tougher penalties of
federal courts.'8 7 Thus, in areas where state laws criminalize the
same activity, defendants may not be prosecuted in an equal and
fair manner. 11
One constitutional obstacle that has developed to prevent these
dangers is the congressional findings requirement discussed in Pe-
rez' 8 9 and its progeny.' 90 Although the Supreme Court is expected
to rule on this in the Lopez case,' 91 at present, the dispute be-
tween the Fifth and Ninth Circuits over the need to articulate a
nexus with interstate commerce remains unresolved. Since Brady
II seems "designed to build upon the foundations of the Brady
Act,"' 92 which did not encounter constitutional questions of this
183 See Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, Press Release #171-94, Mayor Giuliani Hails Pas-
sage of Assault Weapons Ban (May 5, 1994) (on file with Mayor's Office) (offering support
for national gun licensing).
184 See supra parts IIA., II.B., II.C.
185 See supra note 15 and accompanying text (discussing judicial review of gun control
laws).
186 See Pines, supra note 9, at 1 (noting increase in federal criminal laws traditionally
regulated by states).
187 See United States v. Ornelas, 841 F. Supp. 1087, 1094 (D. Colo. 1994) (discussing
vast power given to federal prosecutors under federal criminal laws).
188 Id.
189 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 153 (1971).
190 See United States v. Ardoin, 19 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 327
(1994); United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Evans,
928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991).
191 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994).
192 See 140 CONG. Rxc. 52172 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1994) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum
introducing Brady II on day Brady Act went into effect).
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sort, it can be presumed that review of this legislation will pro-
duce the same result.
Another, more troublesome, concern is raised by New York v.
United States,'9" and illustrated in the Brady cases, regarding
congressional use of state and local government to implement fed-
eral policy.19 4 Such mandates weaken the current law enforce-
ment operations, run best at the local level, and diminish the
political accountability necessary from leaders at every level of a
democratic government. 95 Directing states to issue licenses and
administer a safety course, as Brady II would require, 196 could
reasonably be construed as an impermissible federal mandate of
state action.
IV. CONCLUSION
To avoid the pitfalls of earlier gun control legislation, sponsors
of the national gun licensing system should explain the connection
between the proposed regulations and gun trafficking, which af-
fects interstate commerce. There should be little difficulty in ac-
complishing this through congressional hearings. Next, the
source of funding for the mandates described in Brady II is un-
clear. The federal government could finance all or part of the li-
cense program, although this is unlikely due to the expense. This
would avoid the problem of the allocation of limited resources de-
scribed in Printz.19 " Otherwise, state participation could be volun-
tary, but encouraged by monetary incentives, perhaps linking this
193 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2423 (1992) (recognizing Congress has authority to regulate radioac-
tive waste, but not in manner they had chosen).
194 See id. at 2423. Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce directly, but
may not force state governments to legislate on Congress's behalf. Id.; Printz v. United
States, 854 F. Supp. 1503, 1513 (D. Mont. 1994) (holding that federal government could not
require state or local officials to perform functions required to enforce Brady Act).
195 See Printz, 854 F. Supp. at 1514-15. The court discussed how the local law enforce-
ment officer is still accountable to his constituents even though the federal official is not.
Id. The Printz court raised the importance of accountability for two reasons: to ensure that
politicians take responsibility for unpopular decisions and in the use of legislative re-
sources, to address problems important to state citizens. Id. at 1514. Law enforcement of-
ficers will still be accountable for their resources, even after they have been diverted by
congressional mandates. Id. at 1515. See generally Bruce La Pierre, Political Accountability
in the National Political Process-The Alternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues,
80 Nw. U. L. REv. 577, 639-65 (1985) (discussing, at length, wisdom behind theory of polit-
ical accountability).
196 S. 1882, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(a) (1994) (obtaining state handgun license condi-
tioned upon receiving handgun safety certificate from state's chief law enforcement officer).
197 854 F. Supp. at 1515; see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987) ("Con-
gress may attach conditions on the receipt of funds.").
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requirement to an existing grant program.198 In either case, it
seems clear from the Supreme Court's current trend towards a
more federalist jurisprudence that a direct mandate to implement
a national licensing system will not pass constitutional muster.
Ronald A Giller
198 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (noting that Congress may add conditions to receipt of fed-
eral funds, such as linking federal highway funds to enactments of minimum drinking age);
Linton v. Commissioner of Health and Env't, 973 F.2d 1311, 1313 (6th Cir. 1992) (discuss-
ing how Tennessee is required to conform to federal rules under Title XIX if it wants to
receive subsidies); Massachusetts Dep't of Pub, Welfare v. Yeutter, 947 F.2d 537, 546 (1st
Cir. 1991) (stating that U.S.DA. had authority to withhold funds for noncompliance); Mil-
waukee City Pavers Ass'n. v. Fielder, 710 F. Supp. 1532, 1545 (W.D. Wis. 1989). The court
held that "[w]here ... a state program is enacted to implement federal legislation imposing
specified requirements on the state ... the state program should be considered a subsidiary
part of the federal legislation." Id.

